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Security Information

Official Diary
(Acting DD/I)

Monday, 1 December 1952

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l. At morning meeting apprised the General of the possible compromise of special intelligence as a result of the crash of the C-124 on an Alaskan mountain-side last week. Told him that USCIB had informed LCIB and special efforts were being made to recover the material. DCI expressed vehemently his views as to the inexcusableness of our failure to date to provide self-destroying pouches. I undertook to get him a report from [REDACTED] and Sheldon as to progress on this. Later 25X1A9a spoke to Sheldon who said he would get up a memorandum in conjunction with [REDACTED]

2. DCI called me down separately to discuss future Eisenhower briefings. He made the following points which I then passed on to [REDACTED] for action:
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a. Eisenhower does not like to read text as much as he likes to listen to well presented picture of the situation in an area as illustrated by a first-class map.

b. All comments, events, etc., related to a geographic area should be handled in one package rather than separated on a functional basis as we do in our present briefing book - military from diplomatic, etc.

c. Briefing should be planned from about 30 minutes, compressible to half of that, which of course means the exercise of careful selection as to items to be covered.

d. The creation of a map room in the Commodore in which we can leave secret--or nonspecial materials--should be explored and made ready by the time Eisenhower returns from Korea.

e. No briefing expected this Friday in New York; instead a dry run will be held in DCI's office for his approval.

3. Attended IAC Meeting. In DCI's absence, chaired the meeting for a few minutes until he arrived. Not much trouble with 21/1 on Austrian security, but 64 Part II turned out to be quite a hassle with the old Berlin estimate rehashed from soup to nuts. No positions were changed.

a. At the end of the meeting there ensued a rather general talkfest out of which I consider the following to be worth recording:

25X1A9a (1) [REDACTED] said that owing to the Soviets' present lack of all-weather electronic intercept capabilities, their relative air-defense capability was high and of course at a peak over the period of the summer solstice. Therefore, he felt that we should be particularly on watch for sudden grabs at that time of year.

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3. a. (cont'd.)

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(2) DCI said that [REDACTED] had remarked to him that in the 1930's one could have got virtual unanimity from the top 5 or 6 German philosopher-statesmen as to the basic patterns and trends of thought under given circumstances that had controlled German policy decisions for generations. He suggested that the same thing might well be true for Russia and that, therefore, we should devote more effort to studying this pattern for the Czarist period in order to see whether it might not throw light on their present reactions. [REDACTED] doubted the wisdom of this both as a matter of German history and as a current utility. Armstrong and others thought it worth doing. DCI suggested 25X1A9a that [REDACTED] and George Kennon as providing both brilliance and mutual balance.

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b. DCI commented that he liked the Board draft of [REDACTED] and wished the Agencies to consider it broadly, paragraph by paragraph, so as to comment on substance of the conclusions rather than to concentrate on drafting refinements. All agreed to do so.

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c. Led by [REDACTED] the IAC then generally agreed that over the next ten years the odds were better than even that we would become engaged in war with Russia. No single situation or possibility or area could be appraised as containing the seeds of this war, but taken collectively there seemed to be agreement on the following points which were made principally by DCI, with some contributions from others:

(1) Russia is planning war. The only thing we don't know is where or when.

(2) Russia is adamantly maintaining a policy directed towards control of the world.

(3) Stalin is not a gambler but others who succeed him may be more inclined to put the matter to a touch.

4. The U. S. cannot forever maintain a huge counterforce or afford putting out brush fires. Sooner or later, public opinion will come around to a state exemplified by the German proverb: "Better an end (to) terror than terror without end." Thus ultimately there will come an impasse where they cannot withdraw from a position and we can't accept it.

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It was well put by [REDACTED] that we have not adequately brought this gruesome prospect to the attention of the readers of our estimates. Said readers relax perceptively upon reading our standard prediction; "we estimate that the Russians will not deliberately initiate hostilities during the period," they are not sufficiently alarmed over our paragraphs dealing with the likelihood of unexpected war. Porter suggested that all estimates dealing with the blocs' major courses of action start with, or have a cover sheet pointing out this overall estimate within the context of which, and not separately, the detailed picture should be considered. DCI closed the discussion by directing the group to do something like that so that our language would adequately reflect our basic long-term estimates.

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4. (cont'd.)

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(This certainly will create a shock when it reaches [REDACTED] Further personal comment: If this is true, what in the hell are we doing not considering the NSC level, initiation of preventive war?)

5. General Willems, at the end of the IAC Meeting, came into my room to report in some detail the special emergency meeting of the Watch Committee which was called Friday night, 28 November, to consider the rumor quoted by a high Iranian source of an impending Russian invasion within two weeks. There was no way of confirming this; the Committee agreed to give the matter a low evaluation and consider it again at its regular meeting this week.

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6. Conferred with [REDACTED] of P & P, on arrangements to be made for providing the Special Board to consider American political warfare techniques and policies, with adequate intelligence background. He told me he had been in touch with Sherman Kent and given him a list of key estimates and also that Kent had agreed to review the estimate the DD/P section is preparing on the amount of propaganda, bribery, etc., that the bloc engaged in country by country. This was laid on originally in response to a request by Senator Fulbright and is now being expanded to take care of the needs of this panel. The specific request on DD/I was that we present the Board with a paper, measuring in quantitative terms, the relative costs of the various fringe wars, especially Korea, Indochina, Malaya, to the Soviet bloc as a whole and USSR separately on the one hand and the free world as a whole and the USA separately on the other. I indicated that:

a. This was virtually impossible to do with any degree of significance as the cost of these specific wars would not be sensibly separated from the cost of the US' and its allies' preparedness programs, nor could these costs be aggregated or contrasted.

b. To the extent that material was available, it was much more apt to be available in the Department of Defense, particularly all items concerning our own costs and losses. We closed the discussion on the basis of my suggestion that he consult with Charlie Noyes, OSD, to see if by any chance they had done some study along these lines that would be satisfactory, and if they didn't, whether Defense would undertake to prepare the friendly side of the picture while we came up with our best rough guesses as to the enemy side.

7. Attended meeting of the Board of Estimates during the revision of NIE-64 required to bring it up through June 30, 1954. A very tough problem and one which it was almost impossible to solve satisfactorily within the time limit set (December 15th). Various short-cuts and means of avoiding protracted IAC debate were canvassed and the appropriate team of the Board left to come up with a draft for next Thursday. Had a previous conference with the O/RR people on the question of revising their economic data. Since drafting the O/RR contribution to 64 in April, revised figuring has indicated that we were substantially in error on the underside in our picture of the Russian gross national product and industrial might.

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7. (cont'd.)

Query whether we correct this by an amendment to 64, handle in this revision of 64, or forget the whole thing except for a note of our apprehension until we get to 65. Hoover and O/RR's team will settle this next Thursday. 25X1A5a1

8. Conferred with [REDACTED] with reference to taking on the general survey of research personalities and materials available on Communist China. Details of this are being handled adequately through [REDACTED]

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